CROSSROADS
This policy paper draws on a Hangool Institute community perception survey of 40 residents of Baidoa, conducted in September 2026. It sets out how residents understand the current crisis, how it affects daily life, whom they trust and what they believe should be done, and translates these perceptions into practical recommendations for de-escalation.
Hangool Institute for Security and Governance maintains institutional neutrality and does not align itself with the Federal Government, Southwest State Administration, Laftagareen-aligned actors, opposition groups or any other political actor. References to the actions or motivations of actors represent respondent perceptions, not verified findings of fact.
Policy at a Glance
Table 1. Headline indicators
| Indicator | Finding |
|---|---|
| Primary characterization | 65% political conflict |
| Security impact | 4.53 / 5 average; 91.2% rated 4 or 5 |
| Increased fear | 92.5% |
| Damage to coexistence | 80% |
| Media/social media increase tension | 77.5% |
| Most trusted actor | Religious scholars — 82.5% |
| Preferred urgent step | Direct dialogue — 50% |
Source: Hangool Institute Community Perception Survey, Baidoa, September 2026. n = 40.
Data Reconciliation Note
Gender denominator reconciliation: The source report states 20 female and 19 male respondents, which totals 39 rather than the stated sample of 40. This policy paper does not infer or invent the missing respondent’s gender. The denominator is retained at 40, and the profile is reported as 20 female, 19 male and 1 respondent with gender not reported in the supplied dataset.
Other percentage checks: Most reported percentages correspond to a 40-person denominator (e.g., 67.5% = 27/40; 60% = 24/40; 82.5% = 33/40; 72.5% = 29/40). The 91.2% security-impact figure is retained exactly as reported because the underlying response frequency table was not supplied and may use a different valid denominator or item-level base. The 23-of-37 open-ended response figure is also retained because only 37 respondents provided a coded open-ended response.
Executive Summary
Baidoa is facing heightened political tension with increasingly serious implications for security, livelihoods, social cohesion and public confidence in formal institutions.
A community perception survey conducted by the Hangool Institute for Security and Governance among 40 residents provides an early-warning snapshot of how residents understand the crisis, how it affects daily life, whom they trust and what they believe should be done.
Residents largely perceive the crisis as political in origin, but its consequences are increasingly humanitarian, social and security-related.
Approximately 65% characterize the crisis primarily as political, while 27.5% see it as a combination of political, clan and insecurity-related factors. Only 5% identify it primarily as a clan conflict.
Political competition and perceived Federal Government interference are each identified by 67.5% of respondents as major drivers. Sixty percent associate the crisis with the dispute involving Laftagareen and the current administration.
The reported security impact is severe, with an average score of 4.53 out of 5 and 91.2% of respondents rating the impact at 4 or 5.
Some 92.5% report increased fear, while 80% believe coexistence between clans has been damaged.
The survey also identifies a significant institutional trust deficit. The Southwest State Administration receives an average rating of 1.97 out of 5, with 73.5% giving a rating of 1 or 2. Meanwhile, 57.5% describe the Federal Government’s role as negative interference, compared with 12.5% who describe it as good support.
Despite these concerns, residents retain relatively high trust in community-based and religious actors. Religious scholars are identified by 82.5% as trusted contributors to a solution, followed by traditional elders at 72.5%.
The preferred immediate response is direct dialogue (50%), followed by an immediate ceasefire (27.5%) and mediation by traditional elders (20%).
1. Introduction
Baidoa occupies a strategically important position within Southwest State and Somalia’s wider political, humanitarian and security landscape. Political disagreements involving Federal and State authorities have increasingly affected the security environment and public confidence.
This paper does not seek to determine which political actor is responsible for the crisis. It seeks to understand how residents perceive the situation and translate those perceptions into practical policy recommendations.
Hangool Institute maintains institutional neutrality and does not align itself with the Federal Government, Southwest State Administration, Laftagareen-aligned actors or opposition groups. References to actors perceived to be escalating the crisis are therefore presented strictly as community perceptions, not verified findings of fact.
2. Methodology and Limitations
The survey involved 40 purposively selected respondents in Baidoa. Approximately 85% were located in Baidoa town. The sample included civil society, businesspeople, youth, IDPs, women, students and elders.
The sample is not statistically representative of the entire population of Baidoa. Its value is primarily as an early-warning snapshot of perceptions, concerns, institutional trust and preferred conflict-resolution mechanisms.
The Institute recommends that future rounds expand sample size, geographic coverage and demographic representation to support stronger trend analysis.
3. Respondent Profile and Data Reconciliation
The supplied report states a total sample of 40 respondents and gives the gender breakdown as 20 female and 19 male. These figures total 39. To preserve data integrity, the missing respondent is recorded here as gender not reported rather than assigning a gender without evidence.
Table 2. Respondents by gender
| Gender | Count | Share of total |
|---|---|---|
| Female | 20 | 50.0% |
| Male | 19 | 47.5% |
| Not reported | 1 | 2.5% |
| Total | 40 | 100% |
Source: Hangool Institute Community Perception Survey, Baidoa, September 2026. n = 40.
Table 3. Respondents by category
| Category | Share | Category | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| Civil society | 22.5% | Women | 12.5% |
| Businesspeople | 20% | Students | 10% |
| Youth | 15% | Elders | 5% |
| IDPs | 12.5% |
Source: Hangool Institute Community Perception Survey, Baidoa, September 2026. n = 40. Age: 52.5% of respondents were 26–35 years old.
4. How Residents Understand the Crisis
Residents primarily interpret the crisis through a political lens. Approximately 65% describe it as a political conflict, while 27.5% see a combination of political, clan and insecurity-related factors. Only 5% identify it primarily as a clan conflict.
Source: Hangool Institute Community Perception Survey, Baidoa, September 2026. n = 40.
This distinction matters. If a predominantly political dispute becomes framed exclusively through a clan-security lens, political disagreements may become embedded in community identities, making eventual reconciliation more difficult.
5. Perceived Drivers of the Conflict
The strongest perceived drivers are political competition and perceived Federal Government interference, each at 67.5%, followed by the dispute involving Laftagareen and the current administration at 60%. Election-related issues were identified by 37.5%.
Source: Hangool Institute Community Perception Survey, Baidoa, September 2026. n = 40. Multiple responses permitted.
6. Security and Humanitarian Consequences
Although respondents primarily describe the conflict as political, its consequences are increasingly experienced as a security and humanitarian crisis. The average perceived security impact was rated 4.53 out of 5, while 91.2% rated the impact at either 4 or 5.
Some 92.5% report increased fear. Sixty percent report all identified daily-life impacts, including increased fear, restricted movement and market disruption. Respondents also highlight education disruption, displacement, business losses and pressure on essential services.
7. Social Cohesion: An Emerging Risk
Approximately 80% of respondents believe coexistence between clans has been damaged, with 47.5% describing the deterioration as significant.
This is an important early-warning indicator. Political disputes can be resolved through negotiation; social fragmentation becomes considerably harder to reverse once mistrust is embedded in communities.
8. The Information Environment
Approximately 77.5% believe social media and news coverage increase tension and rumours, while only 2.5% believe media reduces tension.
The appropriate response is not censorship but conflict-sensitive communication: responsible local journalism, verification, rapid rumour correction, peace-oriented radio programming, media training and clear public communication by trusted community figures.
9. Institutional Trust Deficit
The Southwest State Administration receives an average rating of 1.97 out of 5, with 73.5% giving ratings of 1 or 2. Separately, 57.5% characterize the Federal Government’s role in Baidoa as negative interference, while 12.5% describe it as good support.
These are perception indicators rather than objective performance assessments. Nevertheless, perceived legitimacy directly affects the ability of institutions to mediate disputes and secure public confidence in agreements.
10. Who Is Perceived to Be Escalating the Crisis?
Table 4. Actors perceived to be escalating the crisis
| Actor | Share identifying actor as escalating |
|---|---|
| Federal Government | 80% |
| Current Southwest State Administration | 62.5% |
| Laftagareen supporters | 57.5% |
| Opposition politicians | 42.5% |
| Foreign actors | 40% |
Source: Hangool Institute Community Perception Survey, Baidoa, September 2026. n = 40. Multiple responses permitted.
These figures must be interpreted carefully. They are perception indicators, not attribution findings. Their significance lies in showing that residents perceive escalation as involving multiple actors rather than a single political camp.
11. Who Do Residents Trust?
Source: Hangool Institute Community Perception Survey, Baidoa, September 2026. n = 40. Multiple responses permitted.
Religious scholars are identified by 82.5% as trusted contributors to a solution, followed by traditional elders at 72.5%, the international community at 65% and civil society at 50%.
The preferred mediation architecture should therefore be locally led and internationally supported. International actors can provide facilitation, technical support, monitoring and guarantees without necessarily occupying the front seat.
12. What Residents Want
Half of respondents identify direct dialogue as the most urgent step, followed by an immediate ceasefire at 27.5% and mediation by traditional elders at 20%. Open-ended responses reinforce the same direction: 23 of 37 respondents prioritized dialogue, mediation or reconciliation, while 11 prioritized stopping violence.
Source: Hangool Institute Community Perception Survey, Baidoa, September 2026. Chart shows shares of the 39 respondents who answered (51.3%, 28.2%, 20.5%); the text reports shares of all 40 respondents (50%, 27.5%, 20%).
13. Key Policy Findings
- Political roots require a political solution. Residents primarily understand the crisis as political.
- The political crisis has become a civilian protection issue. Fear, movement restrictions, market disruption and education concerns require immediate attention.
- Social cohesion is becoming an independent risk. Continued polarization may produce longer-term consequences beyond the immediate political dispute.
- Neither federal nor state institutions can easily serve as sole mediators. The survey shows significant trust deficits toward both levels.
- Trusted local actors provide an entry point. Traditional elders and religious scholars retain comparatively high public confidence.
14. Policy Options
Table 5. Assessment of policy options
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Option 1 — Security-led stabilization | Useful for immediate civilian protection and prevention of escalation, but insufficient to resolve political grievances and potentially capable of deepening perceptions of interference. |
| Option 2 — Institution-led political dialogue | Necessary for addressing political roots, but vulnerable to legitimacy problems if federal or state actors attempt to control the process. |
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Option 3 — Locally led, internationally supported mediation | Places trusted elders and religious scholars at the centre of early de-escalation while international partners provide facilitation, monitoring and guarantees. |
15. Recommended Policy Framework
Hangool Institute recommends a three-track Baidoa De-escalation and Dialogue Framework.
Track I — Immediate De-escalation and Civilian Protection 0–30 days
- Establish a trusted contact group of traditional elders and religious scholars supported by neutral international facilitators.
- Pursue an immediate cessation of hostilities and prevent further armed confrontation.
- Protect schools, markets, IDP sites, health facilities and humanitarian operations.
- Maintain humanitarian and commercial access and freedom of movement.
- Establish incident monitoring involving neutral observers.
- Create direct communication channels between principal political actors.
Track II — Political Dialogue and Mediation 1–3 months
- Convene inclusive dialogue involving Federal Government and Southwest State representatives, relevant opposition and political actors, traditional elders, religious scholars, women, youth, business, civil society and IDP representatives.
- Address security arrangements, federal-state relations, political representation, electoral issues, institutional legitimacy and disputed political decisions.
- Include social-cohesion and reconciliation measures.
- Link political commitments to concrete measures for restoring markets, services and livelihoods.
Track III — Stabilization and Recovery 3–6 months
- Support rapid livelihood recovery, market rehabilitation, youth employment and women-led businesses.
- Maintain education continuity and protection monitoring.
- Support local peacebuilding and community dialogue.
- Conduct repeat perception surveys to measure changes in security, trust and social cohesion.
16. Inclusive Participation
Women, youth, businesspeople, civil society and IDPs should have meaningful roles in shaping the settlement rather than being treated only as beneficiaries. Dedicated representation should be built into the dialogue architecture, with particular attention to young women and youth.
17. Conflict-Sensitive Communication
- Engage local radio and trusted community figures in peace-oriented programming.
- Establish rapid rumour monitoring and correction.
- Provide conflict-sensitive journalism training.
- Develop joint public messaging on civilian protection and peaceful dispute resolution.
- Use digital platforms to distribute verified information and reduce information vacuums.
18. Role of International Partners
International partners should avoid creating a mediation architecture perceived as externally imposed. Their comparative advantage is to facilitate, guarantee, monitor, finance local peacebuilding, support civilian protection and provide technical expertise.
A coordinated AU/IGAD/UN-supported approach would reduce the risk of fragmented diplomatic engagement and competing mediation tracks.
19. Priority Recommendations
Table 6. Priority recommendations and timeframes
| # | Recommendation | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Establish locally trusted de-escalation mechanism | 0–30 days |
| 2 | Secure cessation of hostilities and civilian protection | Immediate |
| 3 | Open direct political communication | Immediate |
| 4 | Convene inclusive political dialogue | 30–90 days |
| 5 | Establish conflict-sensitive information mechanism | 30–90 days |
| 6 | Create civilian protection and early-warning mechanism | 30–90 days |
| 7 | Link settlement to livelihoods and market recovery | 3–6 months |
| 8 | Establish social-cohesion programme | 3–6 months |
| 9 | Repeat community perception monitoring | Quarterly |
20. Implementation and Monitoring
Table 7. Monitoring framework
| Domain | Suggested indicators |
|---|---|
| Security | Violent incidents; civilian casualties; displacement; attacks on civilian infrastructure; freedom of movement. |
| Political | Dialogue sessions; stakeholder participation; agreements reached; implementation rate. |
| Social cohesion | Inter-community trust; clan-related tensions; women/youth participation; reconciliation activities. |
| Domain | Suggested indicators |
|---|---|
| Public confidence | Trust in institutions; confidence in mediation; perceived security; expectations of stability. |
| Economic | Market activity; business closures/reopenings; employment opportunities; access to essential services. |
21. Conclusion
The Hangool Institute survey provides an important early-warning signal from communities living through the Baidoa crisis. Residents primarily understand the crisis as political, but experience its consequences as a security, humanitarian, economic and social crisis.
The most important sign of warning is the deterioration of social cohesion. Eighty percent believe coexistence between clans has been damaged. If political disagreements continue to translate into community polarization, the eventual cost of reconciliation will increase.
At the same time, the survey identifies a viable pathway for de-escalation. Residents continue to trust religious scholars and traditional elders and overwhelmingly prefer dialogue, ceasefire and mediation over further confrontation.
For the Federal Government, Southwest State authorities, opposition actors and international partners, the immediate objective should not be to determine who wins the political contest. It should be to prevent political competition from becoming a broader security and social crisis.
Methodological Note
The findings presented in this policy paper are derived from the Hangool Institute Community Perception Survey conducted in Baidoa in September 2026. The survey involved 40 purposively selected respondents and is not statistically representative of the entire population of Baidoa.
All references to the actions, motivations or roles of political, security or other actors represent respondent perceptions and should not be interpreted as independently verified allegations or conclusions by Hangool Institute.
Hangool Institute for Security and Governance maintains neutrality and does not align itself with any political party, government institution, opposition group or other political actor.
Full frequency tables, questionnaires and thematic coding are available in the Community Perception Survey Report — September 2026.
Suggested Citation
Hangool Institute for Security and Governance. 2026. Baidoa at Crossroads: Community Perceptions, Conflict Dynamics and Pathways to Political De-escalation. Policy Paper, September 2026. Baidoa: Hangool Institute.
© 2026 Hangool Institute for Security and Governance.
